This paper studies optimal …nancial contracts and product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. When …rms seeking outside …nance resort to actively monitored debt in order to commit against opportunistic behaviour, the dominant lender can in‡uence corporate transparency. More transparency about a …rm's competitive position has both strategic advantages and disadvantages: in general, transparency results in higher variability of pro…ts and output. Thus lenders prefer less information dissemination, as this protects …rms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer more disclosure to maximize pro…tability when in a strong position. We show that bank-controlled …rms will be opaque, while shareholder-run …rms prefer more transparency. In fact, we can predict a clustering of characteristics associated with bank dominance: opaqueness, low variability of pro…ts, slightly reduced average pro…ts, uncertainty about assets in place, and relatively high …nancing needs all should be observed jointly for bank controlled …rms.
Introduction
Comparative corporate governance has long focused on the controversy between the proponents of market-centered versus institution-centered governance. The debate over their relative information e¢ciency is more recent. On the one hand, in the spirit of Diamond (1984) , it has been argued that information gathering may be best delegated to large intermediaries to avoid duplicating e¤orts. On the other hand, the market microstructure literature has emphasized the importance of decentralized market trading to support information collection (see, e.g., Holmström and Tirole (1993) ).
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The present paper does not take a view on the quality of informationgathering by banks versus markets; rather it focuses on their e¤ect on the diffusion of information. Our starting point is the widely held perception that bank-dominated …rms are more opaque.
2 As in Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) , we argue that bank-dominated …nancing relationships are less transparent to external observers. In contrast, market-based …nancing results in more corporate information becoming known to both investors and competitors.
There are some simple possible reasons for this. A main bank may be able to fund or arrange directly the entire investment requirement by its creditor …rm, thus limiting information leakage to the market. Bank loan monitoring may reduce the need for public transparency; it may lead to a low level of trading liquidity and this in turn may discourage information-gathering by investors (see Boot and Thakor (2000) for an analysis of the interaction of …rm information disclosure and investor information collection). In fact, there is evidence that …rms with more opaque assets have less liquid securities (see Hedge and McDermott (2000) ).
This paper suggests a new explanation, recognizing that when information is disclosed to more than one audience, this will have strategic e¤ects in a context of imperfect competition (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1982; Gert-1 A considerable literature has explored corporate performance in countries with active capital markets and those economies such as Japan and Germany where markets have less in ‡uence and strong direct ties exist between companies and …nancial intermediaries. See Mayer (1988) for an interesting descriptive approach, and, e.g., Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (1995) for theoretical analyses.
2 Although we know of no precise empirical study of this phenomenon (presumably because of the di¢culty of classifying …rms as bank-dominated or not), Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (1998) present convincing evidence on the opaqueness of assets of banks' themselves.
ner, Gibbons and Scharfstein, 1988) . Most of this literature has focused on the incentive to disclose once a …rm has acquired some private information. Firms with good news prefer more or less disclosure depending on the nature of their private information. When it concerns their own strength, better …rms may want to enhance visibility (e.g. by an IPO as a mean to commit to more disclosure, as in Stoughton, Wong and Zechner, 1996) .When good information concerns the pro…tability of the market, and competitors may choose to enter, …rms with better information prefer less disclosure, and thus private, bilateral …nancing (Yosha, 1995; Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein, 1988) . 3 We are interested in a strategic rather than tactical decision: we thus investigate the long term transparency decision rather than ex post disclosure choice. Speci…cally, we study the incentives for transparency under di¤erent forms of corporate governance.
In our model, capital structure and investor dominance emerge endogenously as the outcome of an optimal …nancing choice. Investors face both potential managerial moral hazard and information asymmetry. Firms may choose to raise debt, since more valuable …rms wish to avoid undervaluation through an equity issue (as in Myers and Majluf, 1984) , while the less valuable …rms pool in order to bene…t from underpriced debt. 4 Furthermore, investor holdings may need to be concentrated in …rms which face severe moral hazard problems, in order to ensure monitoring. We thus obtain an endogenous corporate governance structure; in the case of concentrated debt, we speak of bank dominance, while in the other cases we speak of equity dominance (either internal or external). The case of managerial control can be subsumed under either case, depending on the shape of their incentive scheme; following Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) , we assume that their incentives have been designed to be congruent with shareholders' interest. Thus our model generates in equilibrium a broad variation of …rm …nancing and governance structures.
Dominant investors in our model focus on long-term decisions, such as the transparency choice; this determines how easily and credibly ex post information will be disseminated. In our framework, ex post information is reliable only if the …rm has committed to a long-term disclosure policy which will allow investors to ascertain objectively its true quality. Ex post a transparent …rm is not able to suppress bad information; similarly, an opaque …rm will not be able to reveal credibly any good news it may have. 5 The reason why information dissemination matters is that …rms face product market competition, so public information is observed by both investors and competitors (as in Bhattacharya and Ritter (1982) and Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein (1988) ). The starting point of our analysis, which we borrow from the literature on industrial organization, is that a …rm less transparent than its competitor does not necessarily enjoy a strategic advantage. In fact, more opaque …rms will exhibit less variability in pro…ts and output relative to more transparent competitors. In addition, on average pro…ts are higher for transparent …rms. These are general results from the theory of competition under imperfect information (for an excellent survey, see Kühn and Vives, 1994) .
The economic intuition for the impact of transparency on pro…ts is as follows. Less transparent …rms reveal less to competitors on their competitive strength. When …rms act on the basis of less information, their expectation over competitors' output is either too high or too low. This hurts …rms which are strong, as it leads competitors to be more aggressive, forcing the …rm to restrain its output; but it protects weak …rms, which face less aggressive competition and can better protect their market share and pro…tability. As a result, under less transparency expected pro…ts are lower, but the volatility of pro…ts and output are lower as well. These results are quite robust and hold for the case of Cournot as well as Bertrand competition regardless of whether products are strategic complements or substitutes.
A reduced volatility (and in particular the higher pro…tability in low pro…t states) has the e¤ect of increasing the return to all claimholders with a …xed claim on the …rm. Consequently, there is a natural preference by lenders for less information dissemination, as they do not gain from higher pro…ts but su¤er from higher risk. Our main result -in the spirit of Jensen and Meckling's (1976) analysis of agency costs of debt and equity -is that dominant 5 One example for this "bonding approach" to corporate disclosure to the decision to go public. In Roëll's (1996) review of this decision, enhanced visibility is cited as the …rst or second most important motivation to go public. Mirroring this, somewhat ironically, the most important costs are "increased pressure on senior management due to closer public scrutiny" and disclosure requirements. This con…rms that the commitment to ex-post disclosure can be costly.
lenders will discourage transparency, as this would endogenously undermine the value of their claims. Moreover, and beyond Jensen and Meckling (1976) , although this form of governance produces on average lower pro…ts, it can arise as an equilibrium response to moral hazard and adverse selection.
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In contrast, …rms dominated by shareholder interests prefer greater transparency, as information dissemination on average increases pro…tability as well as risk.
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There are several empirical implications arising from our modelling. Lenderdominated …rms (and …rms in bank-dominated …nancial systems) are less transparent than equity-run …rms (and …rms in shareholder-oriented systems). Moreover, corporate pro…tability should be less volatile in bankdominated …rms, and slightly lower on average in equity-run …rms. In fact, our theory predicts a clustering of attributes in …nancial contracting: we expect to observe jointly bank dominance, opaqueness, low variability of pro…ts, slightly reduced average pro…ts, uncertainty about assets in place, and relatively high …nancing needs. Because of the non-uniqueness of equilibria for low levels of debt, these predictions should be stronger, the higher the level of debt in the system. Bank dominance should be prevalent when moral hazard on the side of the …rm is an important issue, either because of the ability of managers to appropriate resources or of its incentives to divert them to unpro…table operations (e.g. in conglomerate …rms).
There seems to be no empirical study covering all attributes predicted by our theory. This is probably partially due to the di¢culty of de…ning empirically our concept of investor dominance, 8 but partially also because the interplay of corporate governance, capital structure, and …rm behavior has not yet received su¢cient attention by applied researchers. We hope that our theoretical analysis helps to provide …rst stepping stones in this direction.
In the scattered empirical work available, there is evidence that Japanese companies with in ‡uential main banks have been less pro…table than more in-6 It is worth stressing that moral hazard and adverse selection both are crucial ingrediences of the model, because we endogenize two dimensions of the …nancing decision: capital structure and corporate governance 7 The well-known listing of Daimler-Benz on the NYSE, on pressure by Deutsche Bank, which shed light on a traditionally opaque company, is an interesting example. While Deutsche Bank was the dominant investor in Daimler-Benz, it held at the time more than a quarter of the …rm's equity, and acted thus probably more as a shareholder than as a lender.
8 But see Böhmer (1997) for an example of how to do and work with it.
dependent companies (Caves and Uesaka, 1976; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) and that transparency is greater for independent companies (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) . They also tend to be less liquidity constrained (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991) , which is consistent with our result that bank-monitored …nance is available to …rms who would otherwise not obtain …nancing. 9 Overall, these …rms appear to have less variability in pro…tability and grow comparatively less than independent companies (Nakatani, 1984) . All these facts are consistent with our result that bank-dominated …rms ought to be less transparent and have lower average pro…ts and less volatility of economic results than more transparent, market-…nanced rivals.
Another interesting case in point is Germany. Until 1998, disclosure requirements for listed …rms in Germany were signi…cantly weaker than those demanded by U.S. GAAP. In particular, neither cash ‡ow statements nor detailed segment reports were mandatory under the German commercial code. Yet, there was signi…cant variation in voluntary reporting practices. While we do not know of empirical studies explicitly addressing our question of the link between investor dominance, transparency, and earnings volatility, there seems to have been a consensus that those …rms that voluntarily provided more accounting information were 'capital market-oriented' as opposed to dominated by interests of banks or private owners (see, e.g., Goebel and Fuchs, 1995, Leuz, 1998) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In sections 3 we analyze product market competition. Section 4 studies the transparency decision. Section 5 analyses …rm …nancing and governance, o¤ers some interpretations and comparative statics. Section 6 concludes. In the Appendix we collect the formulae needed to derive our results formally.
The Model

Product market interaction
The model is a dynamic game between two …rms and their investors, in which …nancing and control decisions are taken …rst, and then the …rms compete on the product market. We describe …rst the product market stage, and then the earlier part of the game.
Once the two …rms are …nanced, they compete on the product market. The …rms produce di¤erentiated products and act as Cournot competitors. Firms have either a high quality or a lower quality product, which has an e¤ect on the relative attractiveness of their own product vis-a-vis their competitor's. Quality is described by a parameter µ i which can take two values. When the product is of high quality, µ i = µ H , while µ i = µ L otherwise, with µ H > µ L . Product quality is uncertain; ex ante either …rm has a prior probability q of having a high quality product. The probability of high quality is common to both …rms and commonly known. 10 The realization of a …rm's µ may become publicly known before or after the production decision; we shall discuss this in the next subsection. In either case, once output is realized, customers base their purchase on actual quality.
The inverse demand function faced by …rm i is given by
where i = 1; 2; j 6 = i;and ¡1 ·°· 1.°can be interpreted as the degree of substitutability between the …rms' products, and describes the intensity of competition in the market. If°> 0 the two goods are strategic substitutes under Cournot competition; if°< 0, the goods are strategic complements. By inverting the demand system (1) one sees that Bertrand competition has the same structure, with strategic complements becoming strategic substitutes and vice versa. Hence, although our discussion is in terms of quantity choices, the above speci…cation covers the Bertrand case as well.
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In order to focus on the impact of transparency on competition, we assume that productivity is equal across …rms and that marginal costs for each …rm are constant and normalized to zero.
Finally, we assume throughout that the production decision of the …rm is taken by managers (who can be owners, see below) who maximize profits, ¼ i = P i Q i . This is in contrast to an important strand of the literature inspired by Brander and Lewis (1986) , that analyses product market competition under the impact of capital structure. In particular, in Brander and 10 Given our linear demand speci…cation, the di¤erence in product quality can as well be interpreted as a di¤erence in marginal costs. The two formulatons are equivalent.
11 This speci…cation of demand is standard and can be derived from quadratic preferences of a representative consumer (see, e.g., Singh and Vives (1984) ). Lewis (1986) , if a …rm has risky debt, its equity holders have an incentive to distort Q i away from the pro…t-maximizing level in order to take advantage of limited liability. Since this e¤ect is empirically not well documented and theoretically ambiguous, we choose to work with the simple assumption of pro…t maximization. 12 In particular, at the product market stage we assume away the issue of opportunism by managers or inside equity holders (see, e.g., Hart, 1995) . We introduce opportunism in the longer-term decisions about investment discussed in the next subsection.
To simplify the presentation we impose three types of parameter restrictions. First, we shall assume that …rms produce a positive level of output whatever the constellation of (µ 1 ; µ 2 ), i.e. that there is no exit. This requires assuming that demand even for a low quality product is su¢ciently strong. The following assumption, which will be maintained throughout the paper, is su¢cient to guarantee this in the di¤erent settings we consider later on:
Second, we will concentrate on the case°¸0. And third, we assume that equilibrium prices, and hence pro…ts, are positive in all contingencies. This restriction is binding for competition under incomplete information when°i s close to 1 and q close to 0, i.e. when competition is head-on and quality is likely to be low. In this case, competition is particularly severe, strategy di¤erences between strong and weak …rms are particularly pronounced, and the equilibrium price can be zero if a …rm turns out to be of high quality, after all. The precise condition we impose is that°+°(
Condition (3) holds independently of q if°· :73 and independently of°i f q¸1=2. It is worth emphasizing that all our qualitative results continue to hold if°is negative or condition (2) or (3) are violated, only some formulae will change. In fact, without (2) or (3) di¤erences in …rm characteristics and behavior will be stronger and the variance result (Proposition 1) that drives our analysis will be strengthened.
Finance and control
In order to enter the market described above, …rms need external …nancing of I > 0. Firms are di¤erentiated by the nature of their productive assets and by the value of their existing operations. As we shall explain now, the characteristics of the …rm in ‡uence their interaction with the capital market, both with respect to the terms of …nance and to the control rights of external investors.
Firms are potentially subject to moral hazard in production. But some …rms operate in sectors, countries, or environments in which the nature of assets allows external …nanciers to eliminate moral hazard more easily, whereas the activity or location of other …rms makes it more di¢cult to control managerial discretion. The moral hazard and control problem is an elementary version of the model used by Tirole (1997,1998) ; we assume that, unless controlled, the owner or manager of the …rm can divert the new funds I, more or less e¢ciently, and that there is no diversion at all when she is controlled. As, for example, in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998) , …rms di¤er in their ability to divert funds: a "type-Á" …rm obtains ÁI, 0 · Á · 1, for private consumption when it diverts I. Hence, Á = 0 …rms are e¤ectively immune to moral hazard, whereas Á = 1 …rms can divert funds on a 1:1 basis.
In general, the degree of exposure to moral hazard will be a continuous variable; to facilitate the exposition, we consider only the extremes where managerial moral hazard does not play a role at all (Á = 0) and where managerial discretion is so large that it poses serious control problems (Á = 1). A …rm's Á is public information. For simplicity, we further assume that control causes no direct costs to the controller, but that a large stake is required to be able to exert in ‡uence.
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In the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) , the value of existing operations is private information. Overall …rm value, therefore, has two components: the value from existing operations, V 2 fV L ; V H g; V L < V H , and the return ¼ from the new venture, if undertaken. Investors know the ex-ante distribution of V , with prob (V = V H ) = h and prob (V = V L ) = 1 ¡ h. Firms cannot signal their type by any action besides the type of …nancing they seek. 14 The variables Á and V are independent across the population of …rms. There are, therefore, four possible …rm types:
To simplify notation, we assume that the …rm has no debt to begin with. It is straightforward to verify that our analysis would continue to hold if the …rm had some debt outstanding. The …nancing options for the new venture consist of di¤used equity (DE), concentrated equity (CE), di¤used debt (DD), or concentrated debt (CD). Concentration requires a large investor who takes a signi…cant stake in the company and is granted some control rights to oversee management decisions. We interpret concentrated debt as main bank …nancing and dispersed debt as bond …nancing (or multiple bank …nancing). When the …rm issues concentrated debt it becomes bank-dominated; else it is equity dominated, either by inside equity (under DE or DD) or by outside equity (under CE).
We do not consider the possibility of a mix of debt and equity …nancing for the new investment. As will become clear later, this creates no loss of generality as far as DE, CE, and DD are concerned (which can be arbitrarily combined without changing the analysis). If, however, controlling debt stakes could be su¢ciently small (and be combined with any of the other options to raise the total of I), the analysis would change. Yet, we view this possibility as implausible, because typically some concentration of lending is needed to provide su¢cient incentives for the lender to monitor.
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As mentioned earlier, we assume that "day-to-day" productive decisions such as the level of output Q are taken by managers so as to maximize pro…ts. On the other hand, we assume that dominant investors can exert in ‡uence over some longer-term strategic choices and focus here on one particular such choice, namely that of a …rm's transparency.
Thus, we de…ne investor dominance as the ability to control managerial moral hazard and the capacity to determine the transparency policy of a …rm. This latter policy is a long-term choice which takes place before …rms receive private information about their product market prospects (given by µ i ). A …rm may choose a policy of transparency either by maintaining a broad ex-ante disclosure policy, facilitating access to management and company resources for analysts and researchers, creating a transparent asset structure in the sense empirically studied by Hedge and McDermott (2000) , encouraging if we assumed that the …rm can also divert a fraction of returns from existing projects.
15 Holmström and Tirole (1997) make this point elegantly in a more detailed model. secondary trading in the …rm's stock, list on stock exchanges with stringent disclosure requirements, etc.
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For simplicity, we assume that a …rm can be either transparent (T ) or opaque (O) with no di¤erential cost. For a transparent …rm, its quality parameter µ i becomes publicly known once it is realized. If a …rm is opaque, its µ i is private knowledge to the …rm at the production stage. We do not model here how information is disseminated, see Bhattachya and Chiesa (1995) , in a banking context, and Perotti and von Thadden (1998) , in a market-microstructure context, for explicit models of this issue. The revelation mechanism cannot be changed after private information is obtained. 
Summary: the game
To wrap up the description of the model, we summarize here the stages of the game, together with the relevant decision variables. The game is among two …rms, drawn from a large population of ex-ante identical and independent …rms, and a large number of risk-neutral investors.
transparency policy, C 2 fT; Og. If there is no controlling investor, the …rm chooses C.
5. In the absence of monitoring, …rms of type Á = 1 choose whether to divert the funds raised, I. Firms who have received external funding and not diverted it, invest I.
6. For those …rms that have invested, product quality µ is realized. For transparent …rms, this information becomes public immediately, for opaque …rms µ is private information.. 7. Firms compete by choosing quantities Q (if there is only one …rm to have invested, it acts as a monopolist).
8. Firm quality is publicly revealed, demand and returns ¼ are realized, and investors are repaid. Under an equity contract, investors receive s(V + ¼) or sV , depending on whether the …rm has invested or not; under a debt contract, investors receive either min (V + ¼; D) or min (V; D).
Product Market Competition
We analyze the game using the concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, by …rst solving for equilibria of the subgame starting at stage 4 of the overall game tree. This is possible, because the asymmetric information about existing operations, V , has no impact on the product market interaction in stages 4 -8. Of course, the form of the …nance contract chosen in stages 1 -3 matters for the second phase of the game. But taking these contracts as given, decisions in the second phase are independent of the value of V of either …rm. We …rst examine, in this section, the impact of more or less public information on product market interaction. This amounts to …nding the Nash equilibria of the interaction at stage 7. Because of the assumption that managers maximize expected gross pro…ts at the product market stage, this game can be analyzed without regard to capital structure.
If a …rm acts as a monopolist (either because the other …rm has received no funding or because it has diverted its funds), its choice is trivial, and in particular, does not depend on its transparency. We consider therefore the subgame with two competing …rms. As …rm quality µ is either public information or it remains private, we have two possible informational states for each …rm, resulting from the choices in stage 4: T (µ revealed) or O (µ private information). In total, this yields four subgames, which we shall discuss now in turn.
Competition under symmetric information
We …rst consider competition under symmetric information, de…ned as a situation in which the information on each …rm's µ is public.
Both …rms simultaneously choose their quantities Q i to maximize pro…ts, taking the other's choice as given. Hence, …rm i chooses Q as to max
Firm i's behavior will depend on its own µ and that of its competitor. We therefore have four di¤erent possible states, ij = HH; HL; LH; LL, for the interaction. It is straightforward to verify that the …rm's actions in Nash equilibrium are given by
where the superscript T T denotes the fact that both …rms' µ have been revealed. Q T T ij denotes a …rm's equilibrium action if itself has quality µ i and its competitor quality µ j . By assumption (2) all these quantities are positive. The corresponding pro…ts (remember that costs are normalized to zero) are
The ordering of the four di¤erent pro…t levels is intuitive. In fact, we have
where LH is the worst possible state for …rm i and the …rm makes lower pro…ts than in state LL, the second worst state, etc.
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The analysis of this standard form of market interaction is quite simple. The e¤ect of complete information is to produce some implicit coordination on output decisions, as each …rm conditions its production on the actual strength of its competitor's demand and thus on the competitor's ability to expand beyond its own market.
Competition under symmetrically incomplete information
We now consider the case of competition when there is no public information about any …rm's quality available. We shall index all variables by OO, as all the µ's are private information. Now each …rm makes its output decision at a time when there is imperfect information about the level of its competitor's product-speci…c demand µ j . In this case each …rm will choose output as a function only of its own µ i , and therefore chooses Q i to maximize
where Q OO i denotes a …rm's equilibrium action when it has quality µ i (note that equilibria are player-symmetric). The logic behind formula (6) is simple: if …rm i chooses a very high quantity (Q i¸µi ¡°Q OO L ), then it is sure to drive prices to zero; if it chooses a smaller, but su¢ciently high quantity
, prices will be zero if the opponent is strong and positive if the opponent is weak; and for all other quantities (Q i · µ i ¡°Q OO H ) prices will always be positive. It is readily veri…ed that the game again has a unique (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. As assumed in Section 2, we restrict attention to parameters for which the …rst case in (6) is relevant, in order to keep the calculations simple. It is then straightforward to show that assumption (3) implies 18 If°< 0; i.e. if the goods are strategic complements, we have ¼
LL : in LL; the worst possible state for …rm i, it produces less than in state LH, the second worst state, etc.
which are positive by (2). As in the case of symmetric information, it is easy to show that these state-contingent pro…ts are ordered as intuition suggests:
By direct computation, one can check that both, expected value and variance of pro…ts under symmetrically informed competition are higher than under symmetrically uninformed competition. This fact re ‡ects a general result from the industrial organization literature (see, e.g., Kühn and Vives, 1994) and is at the heart of our argument in this paper. It is, therefore, useful to discuss its underlying rationale. The main di¤erence in strategic interaction between the symmetrically informed and the symmetrically uninformed case is less aggressive output choice by the stronger …rm in the most favorable state HL when both are uninformed: the weaker …rm is "protected" by the lack of accurate information. In contrast, there is more output in the HH state, as both …rms, attaching some probability the event of the competitor being weak, produce more aggressively than in a transparent system. This can be interpreted as a result of "poor coordination" due to less information, and leads to lower pro…tability. Similarly, under uninformed competition, output in state LL is lower, as both …rms are too cautious due to the perceived risk of a strong competitor, and …rms are more protected when in their weakest competitive position LH.
Thus the coordination failure due to lack of information makes pro…ts higher on average for weaker …rms. From an ex ante perspective, however, the reduced pro…tability due to poor coordination in high quality states, when marginal pro…tability is highest, is greater than the pro…t gain in low quality states. Hence, lack of information reduces expected pro…ts (over all states) together with the variance.
Competition under asymmetric information
The last case to consider is the asymmetric case, in which the type of one …rm, say …rm 1, is unknown to the market, whereas the other's type is known. Now …rm 1, when making its output decision, knows the state of …rm 2, but …rm 2 does not know µ 1 . In this case, …rm 1 will choose output as a function of µ 1 and µ 2 and therefore produce as to max Q (µ 1 ¡ Q ¡°Q 2 (µ 2 ))Q; where Q depends on µ 1 and µ 2 : Firm 2, on the other hand, seeks to maximize
where Q 2 depends on µ 2 only.
It is straightforward (if lengthy) to show that the game has a unique (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium (Q is the equilibrium quantity produced by the …rm whose µ is known (and who cannot condition on the other …rm's strength), and Q OT ij the quantity produced by the …rm with private information about its type (who faces a transparent competitor) when its own quality is i and that of its competitor j. The corresponding eight pro…t levels (for each state and each …rm) are given in the appendix.
Again, it can easily be veri…ed that equilibrium quantities and pro…ts are ordered as in the two equilibria under symmetric information. For example, the pro…ts of a transparent …rm facing an opaque …rm are highest when the …rm has high quality and the competitor low quality, second highest when both have high quality, third highest when both have low quality, and lowest when the …rm has low and its competitor high quality.
In order to understand the costs and bene…ts of disclosure in this context, it is useful to compare the pro…t levels of …rm i in the case where both …rms are transparent (¼ T T ) with those where …rm j is transparent but …rm i not (¼ OT ). Direct inspection shows that pro…ts are more variable under fully transparent competition than under competition with asymmetric information. As in the case discussed in the last subsection, the reason is that by disclosing more, the …rm allows its competitor to react more precisely to the situation on the product market, which makes the intercept of its residual demand more volatile (see Fried (1984) , Li (1985) , Shapiro (1986)).
What is more, one can show that pro…ts are ordered state by state. Pro…ts under full transparency, ¼ T T , are a "median-preserving spread" of pro…ts under unilateral non-transparency, ¼ OT , in the sense that ¼ T T is statewise lower than ¼ OT in the two unfavorable states (LL; LH) and statewise higher in the two favorable states (HH; HL). Hence, expected pro…tability is always higher for the T -…rm than for the O -…rm in the strong quality state, and vice versa in the weak quality state. Building on our discussion in the last subsection, the economic intuition is as follows. When in the state of high demand, a …rm whose quality is public information (T ) can produce more aggressively than if it were opaque, because the …rm knows that its competitor knows its strength, and will thus restrain its output. In addition, in this case the T -…rm does not restrain its output when its competitor is strong, since it does not know it. The analogue argument applies for the low quality state. Hence, being transparent confers an important strategic advantage -the advantage of forcing the other to restrain himself when one is strong, i.e. when the gains from aggressiveness are highest -, even if the competitor remains opaque.
Because of the convexity of pro…ts in µ (see (A11) -(A15) in the appendix), the increased volatility of pro…ts under transparency has an interesting consequence: outward shifts of high pro…t realizations are more important than downward shifts of low realizations. This, however, increases the mean. Formally, it can be checked by direct calculation that this holds true regardless of the choice C 2 fT; Og of the other …rm. The above …nd-ings about relative pro…t levels drive our analysis of transparency choice in the next section; we, therefore, summarize them in the following proposition. We note in passing that what is important for the analysis is the variance result, not that on mean pro…ts.
Proposition 1 For any choice C 2 fT; Og of the other …rm, the mean and the variance of a …rm's pro…ts are higher under transparency than under opacity:
Proof. Direct computation shows that
The result for the variances follows similarly.
Moral Hazard and Transparency Choice
In stages 4 and 5 of the game, dominant investors decide whether to monitor, and moral-hazard-prone …rms (Á = 1) who are not monitored decide whether to invest their funds or whether to divert them. We now analyze these decisions working backwards, beginning with the …rms' decision in stage 5.
Diversion
Consider a …rm of asset type Á = 1 who is not monitored, either because it has no dominant investor or because its dominant investor decided not to monitor. In either case, its payo¤ from diverting its funds depends on the type of outside …nance it has raised in stages 2 and 3 of the game and on the transparency choice in stage 4. Suppose …rst that the …rm has been …nanced through debt with face value D. Then the …rm will divert its funds instead of investing, if and only if
where V 2 fV L ; V H g is the …rm's value without investment and ¼ the return from investing (here ¼ is any of the random variables derived in the last section -which one is decided in stage 4 -or the monopoly return). Similarly, the …rm diverts under equity …nance if and only if
Both conditions, (11) and (12), simply state that the return from investing I is smaller than the gain from stealing I.
Monitoring
In stage 4 of the game, dominant investors, if they exist, decide whether to monitor Á = 1 -…rms. This decision depends on what they know about the …rm's existing value V . Consider, for example, the case where the …nancing choice in stages 2 and 3 has been CD, i.e. the dominant investor is a creditor. If stages 2 and 3 have revealed the …rm's V , the creditor will monitor if and only if (11) holds and
i.e. if the debtor would divert and the returns with monitoring exceed those without. Clearly, condition (13) is always satis…ed. The reason why we note this obvious inequality, is to show that the argument would continue to hold for small positive monitoring costs (which would be added on the right hand side of (13).
With the assumption of small monitoring costs, the other subgames are similarly obvious: a dominant investor will monitor a Á = 1 -…rm if and only if the …rm would divert otherwise.
Transparency
The other decision taken in stage 4 of the overall game is the choice of transparency, either by the …rm itself (if there is no dominant investor) or by the dominant investor. If (o¤ the equilibrium path) the contracts in stage 2 and 3 are such that one …rm does not obtain funding or diverts its funds in stage 5, there is only one …rm on the market in stage 6 to 8, and transparency does not matter. 19 We can, therefore, focus on the case of two …rms who will compete on the product market.
Consider …rst a …rm that is equity …nanced. The following proposition is a straightforward implication of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 For an equity-…nanced …rm (choices CE or DE in stages 2 and 3), transparency is a dominant strategy in the subgame of transparency choice in stage 4.
Indeed, because transparency causes an increase in mean pro…ts regardless of the competitor's choice, whoever controls the …rm prefers transparency over opaqueness, as long as his payo¤ is increasing in E¼.
20 As mentioned earlier, Proposition 2 continues to hold if the …rm has debt outstanding, but is equity controlled. This also follows from the next proposition, which considers the subgames following dispersed debt …nancing (where the …rm's equity holders are in control).
Proposition 3 If a …rm is …nanced through dispersed debt, transparency is a dominant strategy in the subgame of transparency choice. Proof. Denote the debt level of the …rm in question by D. Given the choice C 2 fT; Og of the other …rm, the …rm prefers to be transparent if and only if
As discussed in Section 3, it is straightforward to show by direct calculation that pro…ts under T C are more variable than under OC (for C 2 fT; Og), with ¼ T C being a "median-preserving spread" of ¼ OC , in the sense that ¼ T C is statewise lower than ¼ OC in the two unfavorable states for the …rm in question (LL; LH) and statewise higher in the two favorable states (HH; HL). As discussed in Section 3, the e¤ect of information revelation is in general to produce some implicit coordination in output decisions, as the informed …rm conditions its production on the actual strength of its competitor's demand and thus on the competitor's ability to market aggressively. This implicit coordination is so valuable that an equity-controlled …rm unilaterally prefers to become transparent. Hence, the case of equity control is a direct generalization of the literature on endogenous information sharing, cited in Section 3, to the case of a capital structure with debt and equity.
The …nal subgames to consider at the stage of transparency choice are those in which a creditor is in control (CD). Here, two technical problems of little economic interest can complicate the analysis compared to that of Propositions 2 and 3. First, if the required loan, I, is smaller than V L + ¼
T C LH
(the smallest possible return to investing if the other …rm chooses C), then debt will be riskless, D = I, and lenders will be indi¤erent between transparency and opaqueness. And second, if debt is so high (close to V H + ¼ T C HL in Figure 1 ) that the debtor goes bankrupt almost all the time, then the creditor will behave like the residual claimant and is, of course, indistinguishable from an equity investor. Neither of these two points poses a technical problem for the analysis, but both create uninteresting sub-cases; to focus the exposition we shall assume them both away. For the …rst problem, this amounts to assuming that I is su¢ciently large to make debt risky, independent of the transparency choice of the other …rm. For the second, this requires to assume that I is not so big as to make debt look like equity. More precisely, we assume
We can now state the sequel to Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4 Assume that a …rm is …nanced with concentrated debt and that Assumption (15) holds. If the creditor believes with some positive probability that the …rm is of type V L , then the creditor's dominant strategy in the transparency subgame in stage 4 is opaqueness, C = O.
The proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 3 and omitted.
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The key feature of the case of creditor control is that the dominant interest now is to protect the downside of pro…ts. As this downside is greater under opaqueness than under transparency (see Figure 1) , the creditor will prefer opaqueness, even though its expected value is lower, if his debt is risky under transparency. As long as the creditor is not certain that the …rm is of type V H , Assumption (15) is a su¢cient condition for debt being risky under transparency: as D > I, there is a positive probability (q(1 ¡ q) times the probability the creditor attaches to
Proposition 4 provides a converse to Propositions 2 and 3: whereas in the case of equity control …rms will be transparent, dominant lenders will avoid transparency, if debt is risky. These results are surprisingly strong, as this behavior is produced by dominant strategies. 21 The …rst inequality deals with the …rst of the two points raised and rules out multiple equilibria generated by indi¤erence -not a very interesting case. For a full analysis, see Perotti and von Thadden (1998) . The second ineqality states that I should be su¢ciently smaller than the right hand side. The precise threshold is given by the smaller of the two I C , C 2 fT; Og, for which
HL (the maximum possible return) and is typically so high that the constraint in assumption (15) is not binding. 22 A minor twist compared to that proof is that the controlling party here may not know the …rm's pro…tability (if the …nancing in stage 2 and 3 is pooling). Therefore, the proof is in two (very similar) parts, one for the case of pooling, one for separating (and has more parts if one wants to consider mixed-strategy equilibria in the …nancing game).
Hence, if a …rm is debt controlled, its dominant investor will choose opaqueness, a strategy which reduces the …rm's expected pro…ts. The interesting question, to which we turn now, is why a …rm may approach such an investor.
Finance
The last step in our backwards induction analysis is the …nancing game in stages 2 and 3, where we will …rst study the interaction between one …rm and the capital market. Given the dominance results in the last section, the case of two …rms will be a simple extension. To simplify notation, we …rst suppress the reference to the other …rm and let
denote the (random) future returns from investing, holding the transparency choice C of the other …rm …xed. If the other …rm does not invest, ¼ T = ¼ O is the monopoly pro…t. If the other …rm invests, Proposition 1 has shown that E¼ T > E¼ O . Let us …rst consider the case of a …rm without a moral hazard problem (Á = 0). In this case, there is no need for outside monitoring, and the …rm will …nance itself through dispersed debt or outside equity, depending on its return characteristics. As this case is relatively standard corporate …nance, we do not develop it here. The only feature of importance in our context is that the …rm will be equity controlled, and therefore, by Propositions 2 and 3, transparent.
The more interesting case is that of a moral-hazard prone …rm, i.e. Á = 1. We shall focus on the pooling equilibrium in which both types of V 2 fV L ; V H g issue concentrated debt with zero expected pro…ts to the investors. The …rm's debt level, D ¤ , is then given by
Under this contract, both types of …rms will be bank monitored and nontransparent. Denote the expected payo¤ of …rm type i = L; H under this contract by
In order for this contract to be an equilibrium, several assumptions need to be satis…ed. We will …rst derive these assumptions and later discuss their restrictiveness. The …rst assumption is that the …rm must be willing to undertake the project at all under these terms. This means
The next two assumptions concern deviations by the …rm to di¤erent …nancing choices. In order to establish the proposed pooling equilibrium, we require that under the most unfavorable market belief following a deviation, such a deviation is less pro…table to the …rm than the equilibrium contract. In other words, we assume that o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs by the market are pessimistic. This assumption is in the spirit of Myers and Majluf's (1984) original work and of most of the empirical work on the pecking order, and yields a minimal set of restrictions for our analysis.
The …rst assumption in this vein excludes deviations to dispersed debt:
Condition (20) describes the o¤-the-equilibrium scenario in which the …rm raises fairly priced dispersed debt (with pessimistic market beliefs). Then there is no monitoring (by assumption), in which case we know from Proposition 3 that the …rm prefers transparency over opaqueness. Condition (19) now states that the V L type of …rm in this situation will prefer to divert its funds. The payo¤ expected by investors, therefore, is min(V L ; D) (remember the assumption that market beliefs are pessimistic), which, by Assumption (15), is strictly smaller than I. Thus fairly priced dispersed debt …nancing is not an option, as investors would refuse to underwrite it. Clearly, unfairly priced debt would only increase the …rm's moral hazard problem.
The second assumption concerning alternative funding choices concerns equity …nance. In order for a …rm not to deviate to equity …nance, we assume
Given our assumption of zero monitoring costs, (21) is necessary and su¢cient for a deviation to equity …nance to be unpro…table under pessimistic market beliefs (remember that by Proposition 2 controlling equity holders will choose transparency).
Conditions (18), (19) and (21) are necessary and su¢cient for an equilibrium with concentrated debt to exist. Condition (18) implies that the new investment is pro…table even under opaqueness, so that E¼ O > I. Proposition 1 then ensures that the project is pro…table under transparency. (19) demands that the moral hazard problem is su¢ciently severe for the low-value …rm (i.e. that new ventures create a large temptation to abuse funding), and (21) requires that the value dilution problem is su¢ciently severe for both types of …rm.
23 Finally, condition (21) requires that the value loss through lack of transparency be not too large.
The previous discussion had assumed the behavior of the other …rm and its …nanciers to be …xed. Dropping this notational assumption, our discussion implies the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let D ¤ be given by
and assume that
Then there exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the overall …nancing game in which the V L and the V H type of type Á = 1 …rms are both …nanced by concentrated debt with the same face value D ¤ and in which both …rms are opaque.
Proof. We know from the earlier discussion that the existence of the pooling equilibrium in the game between a …rm and its investors, taking the other …rm's decision C as …xed, is equivalent to the …ve conditions (18), (19) and (21). Here we consider C = O. Condition (A1) is the …rst half of assumption (15) in section 4; it can be veri…ed that the second half of (15) (18) is the one for the V H -type. Indeed, writing out the condition for the V L -type (denoting the c.d.f. of ¼ O by F ), one has
The set of assumptions in Proposition 5 may look restrictive, but they are fairly natural. Condition (A1) simply states that debt is risky, a necessary restriction for our analysis, which does not apply to the case of riskless debt.
Condition (A2) is the participation constraint for the V H -type. If it is violated, the more valuable …rm prefers to forego raising funds for the new venture. If the V H -type accepts the dilution of existing …rm value brought about by the debt contract, the V L type does so, too (since they stand to gain from the overpriced funding). Condition (A2) is a strengthening of the condition that the project has positive net present value: the project should be su¢ciently pro…table for the …rm to be interesting, even if the mispricing of the issued securities implies that the …rm must give up part of its existing value in some contingencies.
Condition (A3) concerns the moral hazard problem. In its simpli…ed form given here, it is easy to interpret: If investors receive a su¢cient part of total returns of a bad …rm, V L + E¼ T O , to break even, then the remainder is not attractive enough to keep the …rm honest (in the terms of Holmström and Tirole (1997) , the …rm's pledgeable income is not su¢cient). Conditions (A4) and (A5) concern the dilution problem of equity, which must be suf…ciently strong for both types of …rms, in order to rule out equity …nance.
Interestingly, and di¤erent from the simplest Myers-Majluf case, it can be shown that neither of the two conditions implies the other.
Clearly, there are conditions under which other equilibria are possible. The case we study is one in which the investment is valuable enough to encourage external …nancing even if securities are mispriced, but not so large as to make owners insensitive to a proper pricing of existing activities or to make moral hazard negligeable.
A qualitative interpretation of the conditions in Proposition 5 yields the following rough taxonomy. For the proposed pooling equilibrium to exist, the di¤erence between returns under transparency and opaqueness should not be too large (in order to make the deviations in A3, A4, and A5 not too attractive), V H should not be too large (for the high type's participation constraint (A2)) and not too small (for the dilution constraint (A4)), V L should not be too large (for the moral hazard constraint (A3) and the dilution constraint (A5)), and I should be neither too high (for the participation constraint (A2)) nor too low (for the moral hazard constraint (A3) and the dilution constraint (A5)).
For concreteness and to get a sense of the order of magnitudes, Table  1 provides quantitative information for a simulation of the model with the following parameter speci…cations. For the product market stage, we …x q =°= :5 and µ H = 2µ L = 100. This yields E¼ T O = 1078 and E¼ OO = 1056. We further …x h = :5 (equal proportion of high and low asset value …rms), let V L and V H vary, and investigate the constraints on I de…ned by (A1) to (A5). Table 1 These simulations re ‡ect the rough taxonomy developed above; note that in the given speci…cation the dilution constraint (A4) of the H-type is redun-dant (this changes for di¤erent values of h). Note also that for su¢ciently high and homogenous values of existing asset values (the last row of Table 1), the dilution constraint of the L-type (A5) and the participation constraint (A2) of the H-type are inconsistent: the L-type's asset base is su¢ciently important and similar to that of the H-type for him to no longer want to pool with the H-type at conditions that are acceptable to the H-type. Although these results are, of course, only illustrative, they show that the parameter values described by conditions (A1) to (A5) form a su¢ciently large set and are of the right order of magnitude to make the proposed equilibrium relevant.
This allows us to characterize the …rm characteristics for which our equilibrium of bank dominance and opaqueness is most relevant: …rms with a large, pro…table investment opportunity and moderate amount of assets in place, but with some uncertainty concerning their value, prone to a moral hazard con ‡ict between insiders and outsiders, because of the ability of managers to divert resources according to their own goals.
Notice that if the …rm is a young venture with few initial assets and little uncertainty about these assets (V H small), the value of the new project will swamp any consideration of dilution, and equity …nancing would be preferred. This suggests that new …rms with high growth opportunities are less likely to use bank debt, particularly if they are in a sector in which the gain from establishing leadership (i.e. the ability to show a strong competitive position via transparency) far exceed the cost of mispricing initial assets.
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At the same time, concentrated ownership of equity will emerge in sectors and in countries in which it is hard to control moral hazard, and where there are strong strategic advantages to establish market leadership. This is consistent with the empirical results in the literature on the legal determinants of ownership (LaPorta et al., 1999) .
Conclusions
In this paper we have highlighted the impact of the dominant investors on the di¤usion of information. In particular, we provide a rationale for the observation that lender-dominated …rms are often more opaque. We suggest that even besides the lower degree of transparency accompanying private debt …nancing, public disclosure and the informativeness of security prices may be deliberately discouraged by a dominant lender in order to reduce the riskiness of his loan.
An interesting side result is that the informational advantage of an opaque …rm facing a transparent competitor does not translate in an outright competitive advantage. While lack of transparency ensures that it is shielded when in a weak competitive position, when the …rm is in a strong position it cannot take full advantage of mutual knowledge of its strength to restrain output by competitors, losing market share precisely when its product is relatively pro…table. Hence, the value of transparency depends on whether investors are interested in the upside or the downside of pro…ts.
As a basis for our analysis of the in ‡uence of lender control on …rm transparency, the paper also provides a rational for lender control. Our argument synthesizes two strands of the literature -the capital structure theory in the tradition of Myers and Majluf (1984) and the corporate control literature in the spirit of Holmström and Tirole (1997) . We argue that although there is a downside to lender control -strategic interference which yields lower expected pro…ts -, there is an important upside -the control of managerial moral hazard. If the …rm's asset structure and environment makes managerial moral hazard an important issue (Á = 1), if the e¢ciency loss from opaqueness (E¼ T ¡ E¼ O ) is not too large, if the required injection of funds (I) is su¢ciently large, but still small enough to make the project su¢ciently pro…table, and if the evaluation of existing …rm value is su¢ciently di¢cult (V H ¡ V L large and h not too close to 1), we argue that …rms will …nd it optimal to seek debt …nance from a dominant investor.
Our notion of debtor control captures a limited, but probably important part in some institutional settings of the corporate governance problem. One quali…cation, however, that bears repeating is that in order to exert control, debt holders must act in a concerted manner, which is usually impossible if debt is widely held, and that equity must be relatively weak. This is due to the fact that out of bankruptcy, equity has the formal control rights and can, therefore, impose its preferences on debt holders (unless explicitly restricted by covenants). As a consequence, we have the following rough taxonomy to anchor the classi…cation of our theory institutionally. "Equity control" is present whenever equity is strong (in particular, there is a large, active owner). "Debt control" prevails if equity is weak and there are in ‡uential debt holders, in particular banks. Finally, if equity and debt are both relatively weak (e.g., widely held), we expect neither of our two modes to prevail, but rather management to be in control. In this latter case, our approach suggests that whether management has a preference towards opaqueness or transparency depends on whether its compensation package is more sensitive to downside risk or upside potential.
In an international context, our notion of debt control is presumably more relevant to Japanese or European than to US companies, where equity or management control seems to be the norm out of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Thus on average our model predicts higher corporate transparency in the US (and perhaps the UK) relative to Japan and Europe.
On the corporate level, we predict that the following attributes of publicly traded companies be clustered: equity dominance (in particular, concentrated, non-institutional ownership), managerial compensation in the form of stock options, corporate transparency, (relatively) informative stock prices, and volatile earnings. On the other side, we expect to observe jointly: bank debt with active monitoring, less corporate transparency, less informative stock prices, and less volatile earnings. In fact, the paper predicts a kind of stickiness of opaqueness in the following sense. In equilibrium, investors in Á = 1 -…rms (those who are di¢cult to monitor and control in the …rst place) will choose opaqueness, and Á = 0 -…rms will be transparent. Hence, if the …rm is di¢cult to monitor ex ante, it will be non-transparent ex-post, and vice versa.
Our model allows for several interesting extensions which may shed light on some recent trends in European capital markets. In the explicit market microstructure model in Perotti and von Thadden (1998) , if market depth (i.e. the amount of noise trading) increases, informed trading profits increase. Suppose that initially corporate boards dominated by banks keep …rms opaque so as to discourage information-gathering. Once liquidity increases enough, informed trading becomes pro…table, and a policy of opaqueness can no longer restrains information dissemination. Then corporations will tend to become more transparent against the wishes of dominant debtholders. We would therefore argue that the large in ‡ux of international capital into the (continental) European …nancial market since the mid 1990s and the recent shift to more transparency of many European companies are related phenomena. Opaqueness of publicly traded companies may be increasingly hard to sustain as trading liquidity rises due to rising global investment ‡ows.
Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the equilibrium quantities and pro…ts for the three di¤erent possible informational structures in the product market. They are obtained by standard calculations. Throughout, we impose assumptions (2) and (3), which assure that quantities and prices are positive. For the case of competition under symmetric information (T; T ), the formulae are in the main text.
In the case where both …rms' quality is private information, (O; O), we have
and equilibrium pro…ts
In the asymmetric case, where one …rm's type is publicly revealed and the other's only privately known, the equilibrium is given by
with pro…ts
for ij = HH; HL; LH; LL, and
